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This paper is aimed to provide an economic interpretation on the emergence and evolution of 
the specialised middlemen whose duty is to facilitate the transactions of goods and services in 
an economy. In a general equilibrium framework, the emergence and evolution of the 
specialised middlemen conforms to Adam Smith’s insight of deepening specialisation and the 
division of labour with the improvement in institutions and/or transaction technologies. 
Consequently, the emergence and the growth of the intermediation sector in both absolute 
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productivity, the reduction in wholesaling-retailing price dispersion, will be realised in 
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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of market intermediation has been long recognized in literature. Jones (1936) 
investigated retail stores in the United States in the years between 1800 and 1860 and found 
that as transportation and communication facilities became better, the number of retailing 
outlets increased and the competition intensified. Atack and Passell (1994, p. 523) provided a 
recent incarnation of a similar story. Their data is reproduced in Table 1 which lists the 
employment data in the US labour market during 1840-1990. The whole economy is divided 
into three sectors - primary (agriculture), secondary (manufacture), and tertiary (services) 
sectors, respectively. The workforces working in the agriculture sector (column A and B of 
Table 1) increased from 1840, peaked in 1910 and then declined.    The workforces employed 
in the manufacture sector (column C and D of Table 1) continued to increase, but with a 
declining rate. In contrary, workforces in the tertiary sector (column E and F of Table 1) 
continuously increased during the whole period of time. More impressively, the proportion of 
labour working in the service sector constantly increased - the ratio between the labour in 
service sector and the total workforce in agriculture and manufactures combined increased 
from 0.08 to over 1 in the last 150 years.   
 
Table 1: Employment Distribution in the U.S. 1840 – 1990 (10,000 persons) 
Year 
Agriculture  Industry  Service  Ratios 
A  B  C  D  E  F  E ÷  (A + C)  F ÷  (B + D) 
1840  3570  3594  500  918  350  737  0.0860  0.1633 
1850  4520  4550  1200  1839  530  1115  0.0927  0.1745 
1860  5880  5911  1530  2391  890  1830  0.1201  0.2204 
1870  6790  6818  2470  3643  1310  2775  0.1415  0.2653 
1880  8920  8961  3290  4775  1930  3831  0.1581  0.2789 
1890  9960  10020  4390  6711  2960  5760  0.2063  0.3443 
1900  11680  11749  5895  8722  3970  7351  0.2259  0.3591 
1910  11770  11838  8332  12025  5320  10010  0.2647  0.4195 
1920  10790  10843  11190  14513  5845  10698  0.2658  0.4219 
1930  10560  10633  9884  13628  8122  13255  0.3973  0.5464 
1940  9575  9635  11309  14995  9328  14024  0.4467  0.5694 
1950  7870  7947  15648  20478  12152  16920  0.5167  0.5953 
1960  5970  6015  17145  22324  14051  19408  0.6079  0.6849 
1970  3463  3463  20746  26080  15008  22916  0.6199  0.7757 
1980  3364  3364  21942  29136  20191  28902  0.7979  0.8893 
1990  3186  3186  21184  29610  24269  33929  0.9959  1.0345 
Source: Atack et al (1994), “A New Economic View of American History: From Colonial Times to 1940” (2
nd Ed.). New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, p. 523. A – agriculture (not include fishing); B – agriculture and fishing; C – Total MFG 
(not include mining, construction, cotton textiles, iron & steel); D – all the manufacturing sectors; E – trade (not include 
ocean shipping, railroads, teaching and domestics); F – all the service sectors. 
 
As a snapshot, Spulber (1996a) elaborated the role of intermediaries in the U.S. economy and 
estimated the intermediation accounted for 25% of value-added to GDP in 1993 in the U.S. 
by taking into account of retail trade (9.33%), wholesale trade (6.51%), finance and insurance 
(7.28%), and selected services (1.89%). 
 
Although  the  emergence  and  continuous  development  of  the  service  sector  has  been 
extensively discussed and its importance has been fully recognized in management literature
2 
– there is little economic study to tackle this issue.   
 
Two lines of economic research are relevant to the current study 
                                                 
2  See example, Braudel (1982, 1984), Chandler (1977, 1990), Hall (1950), Hicks (1969), Porter and Livesay 
(1971), Shaw (1912), and Westerfield (1915),   3 
 
North  (1991)  and  more  recently  Kohn  (2001a,  2001b,  2003a,  2003b,  2003c)  provides 
historical insights on the continuous development of the service sector. Based on historical 
evidences, they stressed the importance of institutions in driving this trend. They argued that 
specialization in trading – the emergence of a specialized service sector which produces no 
tangible goods but facilitates transactions, is driven by the increasing transaction efficiency, 
which is further based on the improvement in institutions and/or transaction technologies. 
They asserted that the separation of trading activity from production of physical goods is a 
remarkable progress for economic growth and development.   
 
Along  with  the  transaction  cost  literature  initiated  by  Ronald  Coase  (1937)  and  Oliver 
Williamson (1975) who have identified the importance of transaction costs in shaping the 
modes of market transaction, Spulber (1996b) initiated a search-equilibrium model which 
endogenized the microstructure of trade – that is, directing trading versus through market 
intermediation,  in  commodity  and  financial  markets.  The  choice  of  intermediaries  is 
dependent on the relative transaction costs and the nature of information asymmetry which 
leads to costly search. His model was followed and extended by including more variety of 
market intermediaries and endogenizing the equilibrium types and numbers of various market 
intermediaries.  For  example,  Rust  and  Hall  (2003)  endogenized  the  choice  between 
middlemen and market makers, and Ju, Linn, and Zhu (2010) modelled the choice between 
middlemen and oligopolistic market makers and its impacts on price dispersion,   
 
While  the  first  research  line  provides  insights  on  the  historical  evolution  of  market 
intermediaries with increasing transaction efficiency, the second research line offers rigorous 
analysis on information asymmetry which drives the emergence of market intermediaries to 
facilitate market exchange via reducing search costs.   
 
This paper will construct a general equilibrium model to address both the emergence and the 
historical  evolution  of  market  intermediaries  in  the  wake  of  transaction  efficiency 
improvement.   
 
Yang  and  Ng  (1993),  Yang  (2000,  2003)  developed  a  research  line  –  inframarginal 
economics, which formalizes Adam Smith’s insight of specialisation and division of labour. 
In short, with the increasing returns to specialisation, the division of labour will only be 
hampered by the extent of market which in turn is limited by transaction costs. Inframarginal 
economics have been used to investigate the microstructure of trade by endogenizing the 
number of tradable goods, number of total goods, and the trading patterns among market 
participates (for example, Yang and Shi, 1992, Shi and Yang, 1995). 
 
Based on inframarginal economics, this paper will endogenize the level of specialization and 
the  division  of  labour  to  analyse  the  mechanism  for  the  emergence  and  evolution  of 
intermediaries.  In  addition,  in  a  general  equilibrium  framework,  we  will  predict  the 
increasing share of employment devoted to the intermediation/services sector (as is evident in 
Table 1, for example) along with economic growth measured by the increasing per capita 
income. 
 
The intuition is as follows. As in standard inframarginal analysis, everyone could choose to 
be self-sufficient or rely on market for sell and buy. Self-sufficiency is lower in efficiency 
due to the inherited costs in producing multiple consumer goods – for example, multiple 
learning  costs,  switching  costs,  and  so  on.  Market  exchange,  on  the  other  hand,  enjoys   4 
economies of specialization in Smithian fashion, but will suffer from market transaction costs. 
Therefore, the choice of self-sufficiency or market transaction depends on the balance of the 
economies  of  specialization  and  market  transaction  costs.  Any  improvement  in  market 
transaction  efficiency will  lead to  the increase  in  specialization and division of labour  – 
consequently,  specialists  emerge,  exchange network expands,  and  number of  transactions 
increases. 
 
Service,  although intangible, is  a type of  measurable product.  Banking  services  facilitate 
payments from buyers to sellers, and wholesale and retail services reduce search costs for 
buyers  to  find  products.  In  fact,  any  product  which  ends  up  in  a  consumer’s  hand,  is  a 
combination of the physical “core” product and all sorts of services attached to the “core” 
product. In this sense, a Lenovo notebook is NOT a notebook by itself. It is a combination of 
a physically tangible notebook and all sorts of attached services - including financial services, 
logistical  services,  wholesaling  and  retailing,  branding  and  other  marketing  services,  and 
after-sale quality warranty services.   
 
In a self-sufficient economy, we might not need these services at all. Robinson Crusoe cares 
for himself without the need and possibility for market exchange. With the improvement of 
market transaction efficiency, specialisation and the division of labour start to shape up - 
including the emergence of some specialists who supply aforementioned intangible services. 
Professional bankers emerge from some producers who used to occasionally lend or borrow 
production capitals. Professional wholesalers emerge from some producers who used to store 
their products by themselves. Retailers might be a sort of people who used to go-between. 
 
This illustrates the emergence of professional middlemen and dedicated service sectors. With 
further  improvement  in  transaction  efficiency,  more  tangible  goods  will  be  traded  in  the 
market – which exponentially increases the overall size of trading network. For instance, if 
two goods are traded in the market, only two trading connection are required. If three goods 
are traded, six trading connection are needed. Trading four goods requires a further12 trading 
connections.  The  expansion  of  trading  network  will  therefore  increase  the  demand  for 
transaction services. As a result, the number of service specialists as well as the added value 
of the service sector will increase, more than proportionally than the sectors which produce 
tangible “core” products – such as the primary and secondary sectors. 
 
Our model differs from Spulber-type models in the following three aspects: (a) A Walrasian 
regime is maintained in this paper - which allows the free entry in the intermediaries market; 
consequently, the equilibrium number of middlemen could be endogenized in the current 
model to capture the theme presented in Table 1. (b) For the tractability of the model which 
has  a general  equilibrium setting, a generic “iceberg” type of transaction cost  is  used to 
capture  all costs associated with  market  transaction;  rather than the specific and delicate 
search costs specified in Spulber-type models. (c) The inframarginal approach enables us to 
study  comparative  statics  across  different  market  structures;  consequently,  some 
quasi-dynamic stories could be demonstrated from our model. 
 
In this paper, we mark-up middlemen who buy from producers and sell to end users. The rest 
of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will setup the economic environment 
which  specifies  production,  market  transaction,  consumption  and  utility.  In  Section  3, 
individual’s optimum choices will be identified and solved – which will be combined in such 
a way to formulate a variety of market structures. In structures with market transactions, 
relative price and relative employment will then be investigated. In Section 4, we conduct   5 
general  equilibrium  analysis  by  assuming  the  evolution  of  transaction  efficiency; 
consequently, comparative static analysis will be conducted to draw some propositions which 
will be used to shed some lights on the explanation of relevant historical evidences. The final 
section contains concluding remarks. 
2. The Model 
 
Consider an economy, with a continuum of ex ante identical individuals of mass M, in which 
two consumer goods (both are necessities), x and y, are produced and consumed. Transaction 
services for the trading of x and y are denoted as rx and ry respectively. Potentially, there are 
three types of economic agent – consumer, producer, and middleman. An individual is free to 
choose any combination of these roles in a specific time – for example, an individual can 
produce both x and y, or just x but need to purchase y from others, or act as a middleman who 
produce rx but needs to purchase x and y for survival.    Note the combination of roles will 
evolve over time. All individuals have diverse consumption preference for the two consumer 
goods. If individuals self-produce all the two consumer goods only for self-consumption, then 
there  are  not  market  transactions.  Accordingly,  there  is  no need for mark-up middlemen 
whose sole function is to provide transaction services during market transactions. On the 
other hand, when individuals purchase consumer goods from the market, trading activities 
arise. Trading activities must involve transaction services, including packaging, labelling, bar 
coding, product lot tracking, inventory controls, delivery and other after-sale services.   
 
Apparently,  to  carry out  trading activities, sellers have  two options to  handle transaction 
services. One is to self-provide transaction services when they independently sell goods to 
consumers. The second option is to sell “core” products to mark-up middlemen for resale. 
The second option implies the middlemen will produce transaction services and attach these 
services to the “core” products and then resell the package to end users. It can be seen that in 
the former setting without specialized mark-up middlemen, producers undertake two types of 
economic activities: the production of physical goods as well as the provision of transaction 
services. They play a dual role as producers and independent sellers. This is an economy with 
partial division of labour. By contrast, in the latter setting, trading activities separate from 
production activities. Such a separation implies that specialized mark-up middlemen come 
upon and the economy exhibits the division of labour. In this specialized economy, producers 
specialize in the production activities of physical goods; concurrently, middlemen specialize 
in transaction services. Correspondent to these two ways of providing transaction services, 
there are two approaches to purchase consumer goods. One is that consumers buy directly 
from producers; the other is that consumers buy from mark-up middlemen.   
 
Before building up the model, let’s first summarize the specialized mark-up middleman’s 
most essential attributes - that is, (a) not producing physical goods but providing transaction 
services;  (b)  selling  goods  bundled  together  with  transaction  services  rather  than  simply 
selling  transaction  services;  (c)  making  a  profit  on  price  differences  through  resale  with 
added  values;  and  (d)  playing  an  independent  distribution  or  wholesale-retail  role.  For 
simplicity,  it  is  assumed  in  this  paper  that  mark-up  middlemen  perform  a  dual  role  as 
wholesalers and retailers - so-called independent distributors, directly linking consumers and 
producers. 
   6 
With  the economies  of specialisation,  a specialised producer  and middleman will always 
outperform  someone  who  produces  both  “core”  product  and  transaction  services.  The 
counter-balance comes from the factor that there exist Coase-Williamson type transaction 
costs in  the market  – searching, bargaining, opportunistic behaviour, and etc.  A produce 
could directly sell to a consumer through one market transaction, or sell to a middleman who 
then resell to a consumer through two market transactions. These two alternative transaction 
methods will certainly have different implications on the magnitude of transaction costs.   
 
For  the  tractability  of  the  model,  we  use  a  generic  iceberg  type  of  transaction  costs  to 
represent all costs associated with information asymmetry and leave the disaggregation of 
transaction  costs  to  future  study.  More  specifically,  we  assume  0≤k≤1  as  the  transaction 
efficiency coefficient in the market which sells goods to the end users, and 0≤µ ≤1 as the 
transaction efficiency coefficient in the market which sells goods to middlemen. 
It is worthwhile distinguishing between transaction services (rx and ry) and transaction costs 
(1-k,  and  1-  µ)  in  the  context  of  this  paper.  In  short,  transaction  services  are  intangible 
services which can be produced (endogenized by the model); while transaction costs are these 
which will be lost in transit (exogenous to the model). 
 




p y respectively to denote the output levels of consumer goods x and y. The 
production functions of the two types of goods are written as below 
 
                   } , 0 max{ a l x x
p     and  } , 0 max{ a l y y
p    
where ) 1 , 0 (  a denotes fixed learning costs of producing goods;  ] 1 , 0 [  x l   and  ] 1 , 0 [  y l   are 
respectively an individual’s level of labour force devoted to producing goods x or y. 
 
Producers may have two approaches to supply their goods. One is to directly sell and dispatch 
goods  to  all  the  consumers.  This  approach  means  that  producers  self-provide  transaction 
services  for  selling.  In  contrast,  the  second  approach  is  that  producers  sell  goods  to 
middlemen and then the middlemen resell the goods to the consumers. The second approach 
means that middlemen provide transaction services for selling to consumers. In essence, these 
two ways all involve the allocation of output of producers. For producers of good x, the 
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self y ) 
denotes the dispatched amount of producers who directly supply to the consumers; 
s x (or
s y )   7 
denotes  the  amount  of  producers  who  sell  to  middlemen.  In  an  autarkic  economy, 




self y y x x . 
 
As  it  is  known,  mark-up  middlemen  provide  resale  services  with  added  values.  As  a 
consequence, the process of “buying in and reselling out” must involve the transactions of the 
same “core” good.   
 
In trading activities, transaction costs will be incurred. A 1-k (0≤k≤1) amount will be lost in 
transit in the market which sells goods to the end users. So, the actually supplied amount of 
goods for the market must be less than the dispatched amount of sellers. For good x, the 
actually supplied amount is 
E
self kx (if producers self-provide transaction services for direct 
selling) or 
E
rx kx   (if middlemen specializing in transaction services rx act as resellers). Here, 
E
rx x denotes the dispatched amount of middlemen to consumers. It is assumed that trading 





rx kx )  and  x r   can  be  regarded  as  two  intermediate  inputs,  both  of  which  need  to  be 
combined,  for  outputs  of  sellers.  In  this  model,  we  employ  the  Leontief  technology  to 
describe transaction process of consumer goods. Accordingly, the actually supplied amount 
of good x is written as below 
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rx x )  is  given  by  the  smaller  of  the  two  values  in  parentheses.  In  particular, 








self kx kx is  the  binding  constraint  in  this 
transaction  process.  The  employment  of  more  transaction  services  - x r ,  cannot  raise  the 
actually supplied amount of goods, and hence the marginal product of  x r   is zero; that is, 




self r kx kx  ) (or    ,  x r is the binding 
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self r kx kx  ) (or    , both inputs are fully utilized. The economic 
intuition behind the Leontief transaction function employed here is reasonable. Consider a 
computer  trader  sells  a  given  amount  of  computers  in  one  transaction.  If  ten  trucks  are 
enough to meet the need for transporting these computers, then more trucks are not able to 
yield any more output at all. 
 
Similarly, the transaction function of sellers of good y is written as below 
 




self r ky y   
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ry y )  is  the  actual  supplied  amount  of  good  y  for  the  market; 
E
self y is  the 
dispatched amount of producers; 
E
ry y denotes the dispatched amount of middlemen and y r is 
transaction service for goods y. 
 
When mark-up middlemen, as re-sellers, mediate in the distribution and supply of consumer 
goods, they first purchase some amount of goods (for goods x, for example) from producers,
I
rx x (namely, received amount). In the process of purchase from producers, there may be some 
losses. 1–µ (here 0<µ≤1) denotes the loss ratio of the purchase in this market. Here, we define 
µ as purchasing efficiency of middlemen (correspondingly, k is their selling efficiency). So, 
the actually received amount of good x is
I
rx x  . Mark-up middlemen then dispatch a portion of
I
rx x    -    that is, 
E
rx x   which is dispatched amount, bundle together with transaction services, 
for  the  supply.  Of  course,  middlemen  need  to  keep  another  portion,
d
rx x ,  for  their  own 
consumption for survival. Therefore, the trading balance equation of mark-up middlemen for 
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ry y y y    . These two 
balance equations can also be understood as “actually received amount = self-consumption + 
dispatched  amount”.  Here, 
I
rx x  (or
I





ry y ) is dispatched amount (or outbound amount, or stock amount). 
Obviously,  for  middlemen, 0 
I
rx x  , 0 
d
rx x   and  0 
E
rx x   as  well  as  0 
I
ry y  , 0 
d
ry y   and 
0 
E
ry y .   
 
We use x r and
y r respectively denote two different transaction services for marketing goods x 
and y. This differentiation is also reasonable. A retailer of daily consumer goods and a trader 
of electronic products have different professional know-how in marketing their items. The 
production functions of the two transaction services are written as below 
 
} ) ( , 0 max{ b l t r rx d x     and  )} ( , 0 max{ b l t r ry d y    
 
where ) 1 , 0 (  b denotes  fixed  learning  costs  of  producing  transaction  services;  0  d t is  a 
parameter  of  production  technology  for  transaction  services,  which  may  here  called  the 
distribution service technique coefficient.  ] 1 , 0 [  rx l   and  ] 1 , 0 [  ry l   respectively represents an 
individual’s level of specialization in producing the two different transaction services. 
 
Apparently, there are four “production” activities in the economy, including the production of 
good x, good y, transaction services for good x and transaction services for good y. Thus, the 
endowment constraint of the specific labour for an individual is 
 
1     ry rx y x l l l l  
where  ] 1 , 0 [ , , ,  ry rx y x l l l l . 
   9 
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where x p and  y p   respectively represents unit selling price of good x and y when producers 
self-supply these goods;  x p and  y p   are respectively  unit selling prices of goods x and y 
when middlemen supply these goods. Apparently, selling prices of producers are equal to 
buying  prices  of  middlemen;  selling  prices  of  middlemen  are  equal  to  buying  prices  of 
consumers through a middleman. We will show later that  x x p p   and y y p p   . This means 
that, for a core good, there are two different prices in the case of mark-up middlemen. Here, 
d x (or




ry y ) 
is the demand for x and y by a mark-up middlemen (including quasi-specialized mark-up 
middlemen) who resell goods x (or y).   
 







d y y y x x x U       
 
Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to capture the necessity of two consumer goods. Take 
good x for example, an individual can end up with the total consumption of  ) (
d
rx
d x x x    
where  x  the  self-produced  and  self-consumed  amount,   
d x is  the  demand  for  x  if  the 
consumer produces and/or resells goods y, and
d
rx x is the demand for x if this individual also 
acts as a middleman who resell goods x. 
 
In this paper, the Walrasian regime is assumed
3  - which implies an individual can freely 
choose to take up any combination of activity without barriers to entry. Without the loss of 
generality, it is assumed that transaction costs are paid by sellers (producers and middlemen) 
rather than buyers.   
 
Here, the model can be re-stated as: 
 





d y y y x x x U       
                                                 
3  For the proof on the existence of general equilibrium in a Walrasian regime with increasing returns to 
specialisation and transaction costs, see Sun, Yang, Zhou (2004)   10 
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3. Individual Decisions, Structures and Corner Equilibrium 
 
Since  every  individual  could  take  any  combination  of  four  occupations,  so  there  is 
  
      
      
      
   corner  solutions.  The  combination  of  these  corner  solutions  could 
generate a myriad amount of structures which make the model intractable. Fortunately, the 
Optimal Configuration Theorem (see Yang, 2001, pp. 134-136) generates the following two 
claims which can be used to eliminate large number of structures which are not consistent 
with  the  economies  of  specialisation  and  the  existence  of  transaction  costs  in  market 
exchange. 
 
Claim 1: the optimum decision does not involve selling the same “core” good to the 
middlemen and market concurrently
4 
 




self y x , then 0  
s s y x ; if 0    , 




self y x .   
 
Claim 2: the optimum decision does not involve buying and producing the same “core” 
good
5 
                                                 
4  Intuitively, an individual would not engage in the production of transaction services (rx or ry) to self-market 
proportion of its output while leaves the remaining proportion to the specialised middlemen in a Walrasian 
regime. 
   11 
Claim 2 implies: if x
d, xrx
I> 0, then x
s, x
s
self = 0; if x
s, x
s
self > 0, then x
d, xrx
I= 0. The same is 
applicable to good y. 
   
Those  structures  that  do  not  conform  to  the  last  two  claims  of  Optimal  Configuration 
Theorem are eliminated from the subsequent analysis and therefore four structures - A, P1, 
P2 and C (see Figure 1), are remained to be examined. Of the four structures, A is autarkic 
structure; P1 and P2 are partial division of labour; and C is complete division of labour.   
 
Now, we investigate each structure in depth.   
 
 
       
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
5  Intuitively, an individual would not involve in the production of a product which involves a positive learning 
cost while buy the same good from market which attracts transaction costs.   12 
 
 




Structure  A  is  self-sufficient  (autarky),  in  which  each  individual  produces  all  the  two 
consumer goods x and y only for self-consumptions. The trade of goods does not occur. 
Obviously, transaction services for trading activities are not necessary; there are no mark-up 
middlemen. Although other services for the production of goods are necessary to autarkic 
producers, it is reasonable to consider these services as part of the production of goods. For 
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Thus, the decision of each individual is as below 
 
1          
         













y a l y









  , 
2
1

















In this structure with partial division of labour, some people produce good x and self-provide 
transaction  services  rx,  for  the  supply  of  good  x.  Other  people  produce  good  y  and 
self-provide transaction services ry, for the supply of good y. These two groups of producers   13 
are mutually trading partners and carry out direct exchange for consumption. In this structure, 
these non-specialized producers have not reselling activities.   
 
For producers of goods x, their decision configuration is denoted as xrx/yry (producing and 
directly  selling  x  and  rx,  but  buy  y).  Some  variables  are  equal  to  zero.  That  is, 
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 ,    for 0 < a+b < 1, a>0, b>0. 
 
The trading partners have the configuration of yry/xrx- that is, producing and directly selling y 
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 , for 0<a+b<1, a>0, b>0. 
 
Given a Walrasian regime, equilibrium is attainable when (a) utility equilibrium equalisation 






x U U  , we have the corner equilibrium relative price of goods x to goods y and the 
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, for 0<a+b<1, 








self y y M y M  , where 
y x M M , respectively represents the number of producers of goods x and goods y, we have the 




In this structure, producers of goods x and y both are fully specialized. This means that both 
of them do not self-provide transaction services for the supply of goods. Notably, producers 
of good x need to purchase good y for consumption; similarly, producers of goods y need to 
purchase goods x for consumption. Hence, this must involve the exchange for different goods. 
But the exchange between the two groups of specialized producers must not directly occur; 
otherwise, it will violate the Claim 1 of the Optimal Configuration Theorem. Accordingly, 
this exchange needs to be carried out by providers of different transaction services. These 
providers of different transaction services can be categorized into two groups: one group buys 
and resells goods x for the supply of the market through providing transaction services, rx; the 
other  group  buys  and  resells  goods  y  for  the  supply  of  the  market  through  providing 
transaction services, ry.  These providers of transaction services may be quasi-specialized. 
This  means  that  they  self-produce  one  non-traded  good  for  their  own  consumption.  In 
accordance to Claim 2, the providers of rx transaction services will only self-supply good y 
for self-consumption. They may be called quasi-middlemen. These four groups of individuals 
comprise structure P2, which is partial division of labour. On the other hand, if these service 
providers are fully specialized, then specialized middlemen of rx and ry as well as specialized 
producers  of  goods  x  and  y  will  make  up  another  structure  C.  This  structure  will  be 
investigated later. Now, let’s examine structure P2. 
 
For quasi-middlemen of  rx,, who produce non-traded  goods y for their own consumption 
(configuration rxy/xry),     
s
self
s d x x x x 
E














self y y y 0    x ry y l l r . Their decision is as below.   15 
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2 , for 0<a+b<1, a>0, b>0. 
 
For quasi-middlemen of  ry,, who produce non-traded  goods  x for their own consumption 
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2 , for 0<a+b<1, a>0, b>0. 
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1 , for 0<a<1. 
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1 , for 0<a<1. 
 
Once again, a Walrasian regime is assumed. Under utility equalization conditions between 
these four configurations







x U U U U    , the corner equilibrium relative buying price 
of goods x to goods y, corner equilibrium relative selling price of x goods to y goods, and 
corner equilibrium relative selling price to buying price for a same “core” good, as well as 
























































































2 , for 0<a+b<1, a>0, b>0. 
 
















ry ry y M y M  ,  where  ry rx M M , respectively  represents  the  number  of 
quasi-middlemen of goods x or goods y, with the above obtained corner equilibrium relative 
prices, we get the relative number of specialized producers of goods x to that of specialized 
producers of goods y as well as the relative number of quasi-middlemen of goods x to that of 








M . We simultaneously get the relative number of 

















































In this structure with complete division of labour, all the individuals are divided into four 
types of specialists, respectively specializing in producing goods x and y as well as proving 
transaction services, rx and ry. This structure mirrors a fully specialized economy, in which 
trading activities are entirely mediated by specialized mark-up middlemen. In this structure, 
the  degree  of  trade  dependence  achieves  the  highest  level.  This  structure  also  reflects 
distribution trade pattern.   
 
For specialized middlemen of rx,(configuration rx/xyry),     
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self
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Solving for this problem, we have 
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Solving for this problem, we have 
d y
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 , for 0<b<1. 
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x U U U U    , we get the corner equilibrium relative buying price of goods x to goods 
y, corner equilibrium relative selling price of goods x to goods y, and corner equilibrium 
relative selling price to buying price for a same “core” good, as well as corner equilibrium 



































































, for 0<a<1, 0<b<1. 
 




















ry ry y M y M y M     with  the  above  obtained  corner 
equilibrium relative prices, we get the relative number of specialized producers of goods x to 
that  of  specialized  producers  of  goods  y  as  well  as  the  relative  number  of  specialized 








M .  We 
simultaneously get the relative number of specialized middlemen of goods x (or y) to that of 
specialized producers of goods x (or y) as below   19 
















  ,    for 0<a<1, 0<b<1. 
4. General Equilibrium and Inframarginal Analysis 
4.1 Emergence and evolution of mark-up middlemen 
In the previous section, corner equilibrium of each of four structures has been solved. Note 
Structure A does not involve middlemen, Structure P1 and P2 have quasi-middlemen, and 
Structure  C  contains  specialised  middlemen.  Now,  we  conduct  general  equilibrium  and 
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, for 0<a<1, 0<b<1. 
 
A general equilibrium is defined as the structure which generates the highest per capita utility 
(see  Yang,  2001).  Consequently,  we  now  conduct  the  comparison  of  the  utilities  across 
structures A, P1, P2 and C. Recall five parameters – a, b, k, µ, and td represent fixed learning 
costs in the production of goods and transaction services, transaction efficiency in the market 
selling to the end users k and selling to middlemen µ, and the technology in the production of 
transaction services td. Since the main focus of this paper is to study the impacts of the 
specialisation  and  transaction  costs  on  the  emergence  and  evolution  of  middlemen,  we 
concentrate on three parameters, a, b, and k. Some interesting results are summarised in Table 
2. 
Table 2: General Equilibrium and Inframarginal Comparative Statics   
a+b  a+b<1 
a  a<0.5 
b  b<a  a≤b<1–a 





2<k<k3  k>k3 
Equilibrium 
Structures  A  P1  P2  C  A  P2  C 
a+b  a+b<1  a+b≥1 
a  a≥0.5  a<0.5  a≥0.5 
b  b<1–a  1–a<b<1  1–a≤b<1 
k  k<k2  k2<k<k3  k>k3  k<k3  k>k3  k>k3 
Equilibrium 
Structures  P1  P2  C  A  C  C 
 
Where:   20 
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Let first exam the impacts of k – the transaction efficiency in the market selling to the end 
users,  cēterīs  paribus.  It  can  be  seen  that  autarky  (structure  A)  is  the  equilibrium  when 
transaction efficiency is very low. Conversely, complete division of labour (structure C) is 
the  equilibrium  when  transaction  efficiency  is  sufficiently  high.  Between  autarky  and 
complete division of labour are structures P1 and P2 with partial division of labour, each of 
which emerges as the equilibrium when transaction efficiency is moderate. As compared with 
structure P1, structure P2 occurs   
 
Now let us  turn to  other two parameters  – a  and  b, the respective learning  costs  in  the 
production  of  goods  and  transaction  services  and  their  relative  magnitude.  Recall  the 
significance  of  the  fixed  learning  costs  represents  the  degree  of  the  economies  of 
specialisation  –  a  higher  a  and  b  indicates  a  significant  economies  of  specialisation.  In 
particular, when a+b<1, a<0.5, and b<a,  AP1P2C represent a smooth evolution path 
with the improvement in transaction efficiency k. When a<0.5 and a≤b<1–a, AP2C with 
P1 does not appears. When a≥0.5 and b<1–a, P1P2 C with A does not appear. When 
a<0.5 and 1–a≤b<1, AC and P1 and P2 do not appear. Especially when a≥0.5 and 1–a≤b<1, 
only  structure  C  may  be  the  equilibrium.  Intuitively,  for  these  four  structures  to  appear 
sequentially, the value of a and b could not be too higher – otherwise, the benefits from 
self-providing transaction services for carrying out trading are not enough to cover or even 
make up for the total learning costs of production and transaction activities.   
By the nature of the definition of general equilibrium, per capita utility will increase along 
with the evolution path. 
 
Figure 2 indicates diverse evolving pathways of specialization and the division of labour with 
increasing transaction efficiency.   
 
A P2 C
- k very low
- a<0.5
- Autarkic Economy
- k moderatly high
- a+b<1
- Partial Division of Labor
- Quasi-Specialized Markup
   Middlemen Arise
- k Sufficiently high
- a<1, b<1
- Complete Division of Labor
- Specialized Markup
   Middlemen Arise
P1
- k moderatly low
- b<a<0.5
- μ<1
- Partial Division of Labor
   21 
Figure 2: The Emergence and Evolution of Mark-up Middlemen from the Division of Labour 
 
Herein, we formalize the insights by Shaw (1912), Weld (1917), and Kohn (2001 a,b and 
2003a,b,c) – the merchant appears from the division of labour as an organizer of the market, 
accompanying the expansion of the market.   
 
Let us exam these structures in details of their respective topological perspectives, structure 
P1 represents the direct trade. This trade pattern is a dispersed transaction form, since it is 
transacted directly by non-specialized producers. Hence, its degrees of trade interdependence 
and economics integration are lower. In contrast, structure P2 reflects higher degrees of trade 
interdependence and economics integration, as compared with structure P1. P2 exhibits the 
embryonic form of the distribution trade, in which the exchange between different specialized 
producers  is  mediated  and  transacted  by  quasi-specialized  mark-up  middlemen,  who 
simultaneously act as non-specialized producers to self-provide a non-traded good. However, 
it is noted that in structure P2 there is no trade between quasi-specialized mark-up middlemen 
of  different  goods.  Conversely,  the  trade  takes  places  between  specialized  mark-up 
middlemen of different goods in structure C. Using graph theory, structure C as a network 
displays a higher clustering coefficient of 5/6 which is near 1, than structure P2 with 2/3
6. So, 
structure C reflects not only fully specialized distribution trade pattern, but also the highest 
degrees of trade interdependence and economic integration in all the structures. Actually, the 
distinctions  among  these  structures  stem  from  different  levels  of  division  of  labour.  In 
addition,  it  can  be  recognized  from  structure  P2,  if  as  an  equilibrium  structure,  that  the 
presence of specialized producers does not necessarily imply the appearance of specialized 
mark-up  middlemen.  Nevertheless,  when  transaction  efficiency  achieves  an  enough  high 
level  to  ensure  complete  division  of  labour  between  production  and  trade  and  between 
production activities of different goods, specialized producers and specialized middlemen 
concomitantly arise in structure C and the economy exhibits the distribution trade pattern. 
 
Furthermore, if we define the extent of market as the aggregation of all goods traded in the 
market, we can see a clear evolution path on the expansion of market. In Structure A, because 
there are no transactions for goods x and y in autarkic economy, i.e. no market, the extent of 
the market is 0 
A E . In structure P1, individuals are both producers and traders, playing a 
twofold  role  in  the  direct  exchange  economy.  The  extent  of  the  market  –  which  is  a 
summation of all goods traded in the market, 
1 P E   is 
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In structure P2, specialized producers emerge, and the extent of the market is 
                                                 
6  In graph theory, a clustering coefficient is a measure of degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster 
together (see Watts, 2003). A higher clustering coefficient indicates a higher degree of connectedness 
(integration) in a network. See Barabá si (2002) and Watts (2003) for some applications of this concept in social 
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In structures C, both producers and traders are fully specialized and the extent of the market 
is 
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2 ; M is the total size of population. 
 
It can be seen that 
0 /    k E
C , 0 /
2    k E
P , 0 /
1    k E
P ; 
 
In summary, we can establish the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Given the existence of economies of specialisation, an improvement in 
transaction efficiency
7  will transform the economy from autarky to partial division of 
labour  and/or  to complete division of  labour.  Such an improvement in transaction 
efficiency not only leads to the increase in the levels of specialization in both trading and 
production  activities,  but  also  results  in  the  evolution  of  the  trade  pattern  from 
non-trade to direct trade between producers  and/or to distribution trade mediated by 
mark-up middlemen.  Along with this evolution path, per capital utility will increase 
which represents the expansion of the market and economic growth.  The emergence of 
specialized  mark-up  middlemen  increases   the  degrees  of  trade  interdependence, 
economic integration and commercialization.   
4.2 Dispersion of wholesale/retail price 
 
Structure  P2  and  C  can  be  used  to  demonstrate  the  impacts  of  transaction  efficiency  on 
wholesale/retail price dispersion. Recall in Structure P2, 
 













































                                                 
7  We use k to represent transaction efficiency. it should be noted that the above inframarginal comparative 
statics is also subject to the existence of transaction costs in selling goods to middlemen - namely, µ <1. When 
µ= 1, Structure C will always dominate Structure P1 – therefore, P1 will not appear.   
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It can be shown that for Structure P2 and Structure C: 
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More  interesting,  it  can  be  sh own  that:  when  a+b<1,  a<0.5,  and  b<a, 
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This leads to the following proposition 
 
Proposition 2: For a same “core” good, an improvement in transaction efficiency will 
result in a decrease in the dispersion between wholesale and retail prices, both within a 
structure and along with the evolution of market structures. 
 
The  decrease  in  the  dispersion  of  wholesale  and  retail  prices  is  interesting  but  hardly 
unexpected. Recall we assume a Walrasian regime and therefore in equilibrium price reflects 
total  costs.  With  the  improvement  of  transaction  efficiency,  there  are  two  driving  forces 
which increase the productivity and reduce the costs in supplying transaction services. The 
first  is  the  reduction  in  the  costs  (lower  1-k  and  1-µ)  in  transit.  More  interestingly,  the 
improvement in transaction efficiency also promotes the specialisation and division of labour 
–  which  is  the  second  force  to  increase  the  productivity  in  the  provision  of  transaction 
services.   
 
Proposition  2  indicates  that  with  the  improvement  of  transaction  efficiency,  such  as  the 
employment of advanced communication and sophisticated transportation system, the price 
differences between wholesaling and retailing will shrink. This finding is consistent with the 
work  by  Nakamura  (1999)  who  shows  that  the  retail  revolution  facilitated  by  the  rapid 
computerization of retail transactions is the source of the decrease of retail prices compared 
with wholesale prices. Atack et al (1994), through citing statistic evidence of North (1966) 
and  Taylor  (1951),  show  that  increasing  productivity  in  trading,  stimulated  by  the 
transportation revolution in roads, canals, steamboats and railways during the period between 
1815 and 1860 in America, lowered the price differences of interregional trade. For instance, 
the use of steamboats shifted agriculture from pioneer self-sufficiency to market oriented 
production in the western states during this period. The wholesaling price difference of mess 
pork between New Orleans and Cincinnati slumped from $7.50/Bbl in 1818, to $2.40/Bbl in 
1828, and to only $1.25/Bbl by the late 1850s. Over the same period, the price difference of   24 
wheat flour between these two cities was cut about 70%. The opening of the Erie Canal in 
1825 had a significant effect in moving western bulk goods to the eastern market. Prior to the 
construction of this canal, the goods from Cincinnati to New York had to be transported over 
the Appalachian Mountains, so that the price difference of mess pork between these two 
places was as much as $9.53/Bbl in 1820. After the use of the waterway, however, this price 
difference precipitated to $3.48/Bbl in the middle 1830s and over the same period the price 
difference of flour was cut roughly in half (also see North, 1966, p. 261).   
 
4.3 Relative Number of Mark-up Middlemen 
 
Let  us  now  turn  to  employment.  It  can  be  seen  from  structures  P2  and  C  that
0 / ) / (    k M M x rx , 0 / ) / (    k M M y ry , 0 / ) / (     x rx M M ,  0 / ) / (     y ry M M ,  for ) 1 , 0 (  k
and  ) 1 , 0 (   . Thus, the following proposition can be established: 
 
Proposition  3:  An  improvement  in  transaction  efficiency  and/or  distribution  service 
technology will lead to a higher proportion of labour working in distribution services 
sectors.   
 
Proposition 3 is  also  anticipated. However, this  conclusion is  based on the expansion of 
overall market transaction in the wake of transaction efficiency improvement, rather than the 
assumption that consumer’s preference towards services will increase overtime (for example, 
Betancourt, 2004) 
 
Proposition 3 is consistent with the research by Jones (1936) and Atack and Passell (1994, p. 
523) as cited in the beginning of this paper. Other notable studies include Hartwell (1973) 
and Czinkota et al (2003). As Hartwell (1973) notes, with advanced transport facilities, the 
share  of  distribution  sectors  in  total  economic  activity  rises  with  economic  growth. 
Distribution trade has become one of the largest sectors of any developed countries. In 1955, 
for example, there were 14.5 million workforce in eighteen countries of Western Europe 
working in the distribution sectors, representing about 11% of the total European labour force. 
Importantly, these countries with highest per capita real incomes (like UK, France, Germany 
and  the  Netherlands)  had  a  relatively  high  proportion  of  labour  in  trade,  compared  with 
countries of lower average income (like Greece and Spain). In addition, Czinkota et al (2003), 
by statistic data between the years 1840-2000, also substantiate the increasing role of the 
service sector in the U.S. economy. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
In the research we  have explored  the interplay  among transaction efficiency, distribution 
technique,  the  relative  productivity  between  trading  and  production,  the  relative  price 
between wholesales and retails, the relative number of mark-up middlemen to producers, the 
number of transaction contacts,  the extent of the market,  the real  income per capita and 
economic growth. By conducting general equilibrium analysis with inframarginal analytical 
apparatus  of  the  division  of  labour,  we  have  developed  several  propositions  which  are   25 
consistent with the historical evidences documented in economics and management literature. 
We show that the mark-up middleman is the product of escalating specialization and evolving 
division  of  labour  between  production  activities  and  trading  activities,  propelled  by  the 
increasing transaction efficiency. The improvement in transaction efficiency transforms the 
economy from autarky to partial division of labour and to complete division of labour. This 
transformation essentially results in the evolution of the trade pattern from non-trade to direct 
trade  between  non-specialized  producers  and  to  distribution  trade  mediated  by  mark-up 
middlemen.  This  transformation,  eventually,  characterizes  the  emergence  of  specialized 
mark-up  middlemen  who  play  a  hub  role  in  effectively  and  efficiently  organizing  and 
coordinating  trading  activities  in  the  market.  The  emergence  of  specialized  mark-up 
middlemen increases the degrees of trade interdependence and economic integration, and 
enlarges the extent of the market. We verify that economic growth is correlated positively 
with the extent of the market. 
 
 
The results of this research not only show the consistence with some existing theoretical, 
empirical and historical studies relevant to this theme, within the neoclassical framework, but 
also elucidate the relationship between endogenous variables for economic development and 
growth. This research can also provide useful implications to marketing strategies. Based on 
this research, we can develop more models to probe into the world of commerce. For instance, 
we  can  build  up  the  model  of  the  commercial  firm  to  explore  the  interplay  between 
organization  hierarchy  and  market  hierarchy,  and  to  investigate  the  trade-off  between 
specialization and diversification and to explain the nature of commercial contracts. We can 
also  construct  a  model  to  explore  the  underlying  relationship  between  urbanization  and 
commercialization. 
 
For the tractability of the model, we treat transaction costs as an iceberg type exogenous 
variable  -  which  is  not  as  elegant  as  the  Spulber-type  models  that  explicitly  model  the 
game-theoretic search equilibrium. For the same reason, we have incorporated only one type 
of middlemen rather than the existence of a variety of middlemen observed in the real world 
– for example, commission-base middlemen, market makers, and etc.    Incorporating these 
features into the current model could shed further lights on the emergence and evolution of 
not only the quantity of middlemen but also the composition of middlemen. This is highly in 
our research agenda. 
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